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I. Libertas Ecclesiae, Not Something Else
Once upon a time I took a tour of the Supreme Court of the United States. When the guileless
intern conducting the tour reached the point at which she was charged to disclose the function of judicial
opinions, this is what she said: “Dissents are opinions where the minority explains how the majority’s
opinion is in bad taste” (emphasis added). Bad taste is exactly what mention of the liberty of the Church,
libertas Ecclesiae, is widely thought to exemplify in the polite company of contemporary academic and
2
popular celebration of “religious freedom.” Mention of “the Church” -- especially of her freedom and
what that freedom is for -- imports unwelcome images of essence, organic growth, tradition, final causes,
and authority, not to mention the Inquisition and perhaps even Christ the King of the universe. Contentfree commitment to “religion,” meanwhile, appeals effortlessly to modern man’s preference for the
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John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. I
am grateful to Steve Smith and Larry Alexander for the invitation to participate in the Center for Law and
Religion’s conference on “The Liberty of the Church” and to so many conference participants for their
helpful engagement with my paper, and especially Professor Tom Smith, of the University of San Diego
Law School, whose formal commentary on the paper was subtle and insightful. I thank Brian McCall and
Michael J. White for their extensive and acute comments on an early draft of the paper.
2
Conspicuous exceptions include Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911412, Richard W. Garnett, The
Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 59 (2007), and Michael J. White, Religion and the Common
Good, 12 THE JOURNAL FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE STUDIES 27 (2002). In his contribution to this conference,
Garnett described libertas Ecclesiae as a “mood” that the courts should adopt. As I said at the conference
itself, I doubt that the One whose Mystical Body the Church is would reduce her liberty to the status of a
“mood,” but lawyers have lawyerly ways of saying things, and I greatly value Garnett’s contribution.
1

formless. The popular favorite in this age of surveys and game shows is “religious freedom,” no matter
3
the arbitrariness ineluctably involved in specifying a generic phenomenon called “religion.”
Is it just possible -- it remains an open question -- that at a conference verily dedicated to
exploring libertas Ecclesiae it will be considered, if not in good taste, at least not in bad taste to start with
the liberty of the Church? Or will it be considered socially unacceptable -- “intolerant,” even -- to
expound the concept of the liberty of the Church in its own right, that is, as understood by the Catholic
Church with respect to herself, which, after all, is where the concept originated? A further question is
whether any possible largesse will extend to my defense of that understanding. A still further question is
whether my additional argument -- that an adequate conception of the libertas Ecclesiae is predicated
upon an acceptance of the concrete implications of the social kingship of Christ -- will turn out to be a
bridge too far, even for those committed to a generous measure of what counts as good taste.
The point, though, is that taste is no guide in matters of jurisprudence, let alone in theology. No
matter where you are or where you wish to go, the only sure guide is the truth. Serious attention to
libertas Ecclesiae cannot but flirt with the truth. Not accidentally, truth is the first casualty of the
inexorable but dubious logic of “religious freedom.”
II. The Church, Not Just Another Group
“Religious freedom,” as it is commonly understood today and celebrated, refers to individuals
and, sometimes, groups acting according to (sincerely?) held beliefs, irrespective of the truth or falsity of
those beliefs, subject only to the commonsensical limit of not violating the “public order” (as opposed to
4
the “common good,” a point to which we shall return). The “right” to such liberty and to its juridical
protection is defended on many, varied, and much-vaunted grounds, especially the avoidance of social
5
discord and so-called “wars of religion.” Anyone who has read John Rawls, for example, knows how
solemnly it is said by the those who are wise in the eyes of the world that the price of keeping the peace is
ruling truth inadmissible as a criterion for determining what freedom to permit and what “freedom” to
deny. The constitutional (and statutory and regulatory) bracketing of truth claims in the name of
protecting “religious freedom” does not officially deny the truth of the Church’s claim on behalf of her
own liberty, of course. It suffices for the strategy’s efficacy that it render the claim irrelevant by situating
the Church as just one among as many groups of (sincere?) believers as can be counted, or, as is more
likely under current constitutional jurisprudence, recognizing the aggregate rights of the individuals who
6
happen to be her members.
3

Ironically, then, I have some sympathy with the question that forms the title of Brian Leiter’s recent
book, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012).
4
For a telling example of what is involved in arriving at a legal definition of “religion” and the place of
sincerity therein, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 141-56, 160-76, 231-32 (2000). See also KENT GREENAWALT, 1 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE
EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 109-56 (2006). For an historical account of the problem, see BRAD S. GREGORY, THE
UNINTENDED REFORMATION: HOW A RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION SECULARIZED SOCIETY 74-128, 167-76 (2012).
5
On the nation-building reasons for what are inaccurately styled “wars of religion,” see WILLIAM T.
CAVANAUGH, THE MYTH OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE: SECULAR IDEOLOGY AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN CONFLICT (2009).
6
Hosana-Tabor is not to the contrary, for it provides an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional
bar. “We conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable
claim, not a jurisdictional bar. That is because the issue presented by the exception is ‘whether the
allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief,’ not whether the court has ‘power to hear [the]
case.’ Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 4–5) (internal
quotation marks omitted).” Hosana-Tabor Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. __ n.4
(2012). The significance of the constitutional limit’s being an “affirmative defense” rather than a
jurisdictional bar is unmistakable as Mark Strasser has seen, though from what I regard as the wrong
point of view. See MARK STRASSER, ON MAKING THE ANOMALOUS MORE ANOMALOUS, available at Bepress.
Cf. Greg Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception,
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS
2

This, though, the Church does not and cannot accept, for it is inconsistent with the Church’s selfunderstanding of her nature. To assimilate the Church to other groups or to dissolve her into her
members is to de-nature the Church, as Heinrich Rommen explains:
[T]here is no avoiding the nature and self-understanding of the Church, if the problem of Church
and State should be approached. Otherwise the term “Church” would stand only for utterly
private opinions by private individuals in that sphere of irrational feelings and unscientific
imagination which for the secularist agnostic is religion. And it is clear that upon such
suppositions it would follow that the political authority has exclusive and plenary competency to
judge about the compatibility of such a religion with the policy and the public order of the state.
The consequence of such thinking is the abolition of the Church-State problem by the complete
7
elimination of the Church.
It is a paradoxical fact that in contemporary culture, the Church must insist upon the socio-juridical
relevance of the truth itself as a very condition of her insisting upon the particular truth about herself.
And, irrespective of culture and time, the Church must insist upon the truth about herself not because to
do so is, say, an expression of the collective will of the faithful or of the hierarchy, but because “[t]he
Church is ‘founded by Christ; therefore it is juridically a ‘foundation,’ not a corporation, and its
8
constitution, its fundamental law, is given directly by God and not ordained by the people.” This is the
Church’s self-understanding, and any honest consideration of the relationship between Church and state
must begin by first acknowledging that understanding for what it is, even as a condition of ultimately
rejecting it. To acknowledge it, however, is to set some of the terms of the debate, for an act of popular
will is a transparently insufficient reason to contravene the divine will.
None of the foregoing purports to settle the exact terms of the relationship between Church and
state, of course. The state is a notoriously changeable and changing institution, and inevitably so -- though
9
within certain limits established by nature and by supernature. History demonstrates that the Church is
familiar with a wide range of relationships between herself and another equally wide-ranging spectrum of
civil ruling authorities, some more adequate than others. My point, though, is that any potentially
adequate analysis on the level of concrete historical development must start with the Church’s selfunderstanding, not with what the philosophers have always already said in order to limit or eliminate the
Church. If today the Church defends “religious freedom,” she does so as an exercise of her own
antecedent mandate and consequent freedom to be the Church and thus to teach the human person who
he is and who he is called to be. Any religious freedom the Church teaches, however, cannot be
inconsistent with her self-understanding or her relationship with her Founder and His divine will.
I will take the precaution of observing here that to give priority to the Church and to Christ is not
to bless the coercion of the unbaptized by the baptized. The Church does not approve -- indeed she
vehemently denies the legitimacy of -- coercing the unbaptized into “believing” the Catholic faith.
Nothing whatsoever in the Church’s self-understanding anticipates a world in which Catholics force nonCatholics to become Catholics. But tolerance, of which much will be needed in the world of today, does
not work by eliding truth and error. The latter work is begun by indifferentism, which is close cousin to
JOURNAL, 43 (2008) (defending a subject-matter jurisdictional position). See also Michael Helfand,
Religion’s Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as Arbitration, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2141510.
7
Heinrich Rommen, Church and State, THE REVIEW OF POLITICS 321, 322 (1950).
8
Id.
9
“The Church’s end and constitution are absolute, always the same, above civilizations and historical
periods. . . .The Church’s activity extends into the ‘World.’ . . . . In each civilization and era of history the
‘idea’ of ‘the’ State finds expression in concrete form, for example, monarchy or democracy, with a Bill of
Rights. Thus there is produced beyond the abstract Church-State relationship on the abstract-general
level a particular concrete Church-State relationship problem which requires its own concrete answer
without the sacrifice of the perennial principles governing Church-State relations.” Rommen, supra note 7,
at 323. (emphasis added).
3

“religious freedom” in its common acceptation. To honor the liberty of the Church is, in the words of John
Courtney Murray, S.J., to recognize that
the advent of Christ the King, the promulgation of the New Law and the supernatural statute of
the Church . . . involved a certain dislocation of the natural order, a diminution of the stature
and scope which the political power would have possessed in another, purely natural
10
dispensation.
The fact of the Church changes the natural world by subordinating it to a “supernatural statute.” This is
the stuff of worldly scandal, not the product of “neutral public reason.”

III. The Problematics and Hermeneutics of Vatican II
Any discussion of the contemporary Catholic understanding of the libertas Ecclesiae must take as
its point of departure the text of Dignitatis humanae, the Second Vatican Council’s “Declaration on
11
Religious Liberty,” promulgated in 1965 at the conclusion of the Council. The most contentiously
debated document of the entire Council, Dignitatis has been celebrated ever since by those who regard it
12
as having worked what in Catholic theology is known as a development of doctrine. The matter of that
alleged development is the human person’s right to “religious freedom” in public. The interpretive
difficulties that attend ascertaining exactly what Dignitatis teaches on the question of individual religious
freedom are impressive, and will tax us considerably as we proceed. It is beyond dispute, however, that
“whereas Dignitatis proceeds cautiously on other questions,” on the matter of the libertas ecclesiae the
13
document is “unusually loquacious.” Here, from Article 13 of Dignitatis, is its central statement on the
liberty of the Church:
Among the things which concern the good of the Church and indeed the welfare of society here
on earth – things therefore which are always and everywhere to be kept secure and defended
against all injury – this is certainly preeminent, namely, that the Church should enjoy that full
measure of freedom which her care for the salvation of men requires. This freedom is sacred,
because the only only-begotten Son endowed with it the Church which He purchased with His
blood. It is so much the property of the Church that to act again it is to act against the will of
God. The freedom of the Church is the fundamental principle [principium fundamentale] in what
14
concerns the relations between the Church and governments and the whole civil order.
10

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM, 11, 12 (1954) available at
http://woodstock.georgetown.edu/library/Murray/1954d.htm.
11
The Vatican’s English translation of the Declaration is available at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vatii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html. Unless otherwise noted, all additional English-language
quotations of Vatican documents will be from the translations available on the Vatican website. Latinlanguage quotations are also taken from the Vatican website.
12
Noonan, supra note 4, at 348-53.
13
RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN A POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD 232, 231
(2003).
14
Vatican II, Dignitatis Humanae No. 13 (Dec. 7, 1965). “Inter ea quae ad bonum Ecclesiae, immo ad
bonum ipsius terrenae civitatis spectant et ubique semperque servanda sunt atque ab omni iniuria
defendenda, illud certe praestantissimum est, ut Ecclesia tanta perfruatur agendi libertate, quantam salus
hominum curanda requirat (32). Haec enim libertas sacra est, qua Unigenitus Dei Filius ditavit Ecclesiam
acquisitam sanguine suo. Ecclesiae sane adeo propria est, ut qui eam impugnant, iidem contra Dei
voluntatem agant. Libertas Ecclesiae est principium fundamentale in relationibus inter Ecclesiam et
potestates publicas totumque ordinem civilem.”
4

According to the Second Vatican Council, then, the libertas Ecclesiae -- whatever its still-to-be-specified
content -- is nothing less than the “principium fundamentale” governing relations between the Church
and the entire rest of the world, and such freedom is called “sacred” (sacra) “because it is endowed by
15
Christ.” This last point must not go unnoticed. As we shall see, Dignitatis grounds the general right of
religious freedom on the dignity of the human person, but the fundamental principle of the Church’s
16
(sacred) liberty “stems from divine mandate directly, rather than via secondary causality.”
Immediately following its assertion that the libertas Ecclesiae is the principium fundamentale
governing the Church and the entire civil order, including governments, Dignitatis proceeds to specify
some of the content of that freedom, that is, what it is in the Church’s nature to do (with her freedom).
That content, however, as well as the principium fundamentale itself, both of which appear in Article 13
of the document, cannot be interpreted except in light of an apparently architectonic statement in
Article 1 of the Declaration. That statement, which I shall refer to as the “relinquit clause,” is this: the
Council “leaves untouched [integram relinquit] traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men
17
and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ.” The question, then, would
seem to be what the “traditional Catholic doctrine” was and, furthermore, remains.
As I mentioned above, the interpretive difficulties Dignitatis presents are impressive, and it is
easy to see why the interpretation of the relinquit clause is potentially decisive and, therefore, acutely
contested. If the document begins in Article 1 by leaving the tradition exactly where it stood, is the rest
of the document, including the “principium fundamentale,” not just a restatement of traditional Catholic
doctrine?
As already noted, however, Dignitatis is widely celebrated and understood as “developing
18
doctrine.” Development of doctrine occurs as “insight grows into what has been handed down,”
moving from the general to the more particular in the articulation of the deposit of faith that has been
handed down from the time of the death of the last Apostle. The principal interpretive debate over
Dignitatis concerns whether it merely restates doctrine, which would be the clear indication of the
relinquit clause, or develops doctrine, notwithstanding the contrary indication of that clause.
The former prospect -- of “leav[ing]” traditional Catholic doctrine “untouched” -- calls forth
formidable creativity from those who wish to discover in Dignitatis a new doctrine on the question of
religious freedom. There can be no better example of this resourcefulness than what a young Father
Joseph Ratzinger wrote on the question in 1966:
Most controversial was the third newly emphasized aspect. The text attempts to emphasize a
continuity in the statements of the official Church on this issue. It also says that it “leaves intact
the traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and communities toward the one true
religion and the only Church of Christ.” The term “duty” here has doubtful application to
communities in their relation to the Church. Later on in the Declaration, the text itself corrects
and modifies these earlier statements, offering something new, something that is quite different
from what is found, for example, in the statements of Pius XI and Pius XII. It would have been
15

Hittinger, supra note 13, at 233.
Hittinger, supra note 13, at 233.
17
“Pariter vero profitetur Sacra Synodus officia haec hominum conscientiam tangere ac vincire, nec aliter
veritatem sese imponere nisi vi ipsius veritatis, quae suaviter simul ac fortiter mentibus illabitur. Porro,
quum libertas religiosa, quam homines in exsequendo officio Deum colendi exigunt, immunitatem a
coercitione in societate civili respiciat, integram relinquit traditionalem doctrinam catholicam de morali
hominum ac societatum officio erga veram religionem et unicam Christi Ecclesiam. Insuper, de hac
libertate religiosa agens, Sacra Synodus recentiorum Summorum Pontificum doctrinam de inviolabilibus
humanae personae iuribus necnon de iuridica ordinatione societatis evolvere intendit.” (emphasis added).
18
Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei verbum No. 8
(Nov. 18, 1965). My quotation is from the translation by Austin Flannery. The Vatican translation is
available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vatii_const_19651118_dei-verbum_en.html.
16
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better to omit these compromising formulas or to reform them with the latter text. The
introduction (Article 1) changes nothing in the text’s content; therefore, we need not regard it as
19
anything more than a minor flaw.
The man who would be Pope opted to mitigate the embarrassment of the relinquit clause by entering a
20
21
plea to ignore it. Later, as Cardinal Ratzinger, he apparently rescinded that plea.
It should be uncontroversial to observe that not to reckon with the significance of the relinquit
clause is profoundly to falsify the Declaration’s meaning, whatever that meaning turns out to be. It is
documented that the clause was included late in the drafting process. It is also documented that its
22
inclusion was necessary to the passage of the document by the Council Fathers. Without clearly -- if
succinctly -- reaffirming traditional Catholic doctrine on Church and state, Dignitatis would not have
emerged from the Council, and what did emerge from the Council states that it “leaves untouched
traditional Catholic doctrine.” This clause, then, would seem to provide a hermeneutical key to unlock
the meaning of the whole document.
On the other hand, however, the document does explicitly announce its drafters’ intention to
develop doctrine: “Over and above all this, in taking up the matter of religious freedom this sacred
Synod intends to develop the doctrine of recent Popes on the inviolable rights of the human person and
23
on the constitutional order of society.” No other document of the Council makes its intent to develop
doctrine clearer. Genuine development does not include contradiction, however. For present purposes it
will be sufficient to stipulate that it is a basic principle of Catholic theology that genuine development
24
excludes contradiction. Again, insight can grow, and new formulations are sometimes possible, moving
from the general to the more specific. Putative doctrine that contradicts earlier doctrine cannot,
however, be treated as what it claims to be, viz., doctrine.
What gives the interpretive question its particular salience, then, is the fact that the core of the
traditional teaching on Church and state was in fact put forward by the Popes as doctrine, not as mere
changeable opinion. Even those who find something new in Dignitatis acknowledge this fact, which, of
course, is why they insist that Dignitatis developed “doctrine,” rather than, say, merely adopted a
different prudential view. There can be no serious question but that the principles the Popes taught on
what we now refer to as the Church-state problem were understood by those Popes to be permanently
valid. These principles, consistently and authoritatively taught, century after century, cannot be
contradicted by later “doctrine,” though their application will of course vary over time. Writing in the
American Eccesiastical Review in May of 1953, Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani summed up the matter as
follows:
These principles [regarding Church and state] are firm and immovable. They were valid in the
times of Innocent III [1198-1216] and Boniface VIII [1294-1303]. They are valid in the days of Leo
XIII and of Pius XII, who has reaffirmed them in more than one of his documents. . . . I am certain
that no one can prove that there has been any kind of change, in the matter of these principles,
between Summi pontificatus of Pius XII and the encyclicals of Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris against
Communism, Mit brennender Sorge against Nazism, and Non abbiamo bisogno against the state
monopoly of facism, on the one hand; and the earlier encyclicals of Leo XIII, Immortale Dei,
Libertas, and Sapientiae christianiae, on the other.
19

JOSEPH RATIZINGER, THEOLOGICAL HIGHLIGHTS OF VATICAN II 147 (1966).
MICHAEL DAVIES, THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 204-05 (1992).
21
Davies, supra note 20, at 205.
22
Davies, supra note 20, at 169-74.
23
Vatican II, Dignitatis Humanae No. 1 (Dec. 7, 1965). “Insuper, de hac libertate religiosa agens, Sacra
Synodus recentiorum Summorum Pontificum doctrinam de inviolabilibus humanae personae iuribus
necnon de iuridica ordinatione societatis evolvere intendit.”
24
Davies, supra note 20, at 210-31. It should be acknowledged that this principle is disputed. See, e.g.,
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A CHURCH THAT CAN AND CANNOT CHANGE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC MORAL DOCTRINE
(2005).
20
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“The ultimate, profound, lapidary fundamental norms of society,” says the august Pontiff [Pius
XII] in his Christmas radio-message of 1942, “cannot be damaged by the intervention of man’s
genius. Men can deny them, ignore them, despise them, disobey them, but they can never
25
abrogate them with juridical efficacy.”
What, then, are those ultimate and unchangeable norms that the Popes have taught? What is
the traditional Catholic doctrine on Church and state that cannot be contradicted? And what
development of doctrine, if any, did Dignitatis effect?
IV. Traditional Catholic Doctrine on Church and State
Speaking in 1955, just two years after Cardinal Ottaviani wrote the language I have just quoted,
Pope Pius XII -- whose 1942 radio-address Ottaviani quoted -- said the following to the Tenth
International Congress of Historical Sciences in Rome:
The historian should not forget that, while the Church and State have known hours and years of
conflict, there were also from the time of Constantine the Great until the contemporary era and
even recently, tranquil periods, often quite long ones, during which they collaborated with full
understanding in the education of the same people. The Church does not hide the fact that she
considers such collaboration normal, and that she regards the unity of the people in the true
26
religion and the unanimity of action between herself and the State the ideal.
If this unapologetic statement of the “ideal” sounds dated or even (as is more likely) outrageous to the
modern ear, consider that Pope Pius XII “[did] not hide the fact” of it a mere ten years before Dignitatis
was promulgated.
The core of that permanently valid ideal is this: Church and state should be united -- without the
27
one being reduced to the other -- in close cooperation. Pope St. Pius X summarized the traditional
doctrine in his 1906 encyclical Vehementer nos:
That the state should be separated from the Church is an absolutely false and most pernicious
thesis. For first, since it is based on the principle that religion should be of no concern to the
state, it does a grave injury to God, He who is the founder and conserver of human society no
less than He is of individual men, for which reason He should be worshipped not only privately
28
but also publicly.
One could marshal countless papal texts setting forth, century after century, the doctrinal principle that,
29
in a Catholic society, the Church has a divine right to be united to the state as the religion of the state,
but here it will suffice to quote a respected scholar’s summary of the doctrine:

25

Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani, The Church and the State: Some Present Problems in the Light of the
Teaching of Pope Pius XII, 123 AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW 321, 328-29 (1953).
26
Quoted in Davies, supra note 20, at 179.
27
See Rommen, “Church and State,” supra note 7, at 324-25.
28
Pope St. Pius X, encyclical Vehementer nos No. 3 (1905), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_x/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-x_enc_11021906_vehementernos_en.html . My translation varies somewhat from the Vatican’s.
29
See, e.g., George Shea, Catholic Doctrine and ‘The Religion of the State, 123 AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL
REVIEW 161, 170-73 (1950). The overwhelming number of Catholic philosophers, theologians, and
canonists were in accord. See id. at 161 n.1, 165 nn.18 & 19.
7

The formal, official, and exclusive recognition of Catholicism by the State in a Catholic society as
its own one and only religion, in short, the establishment of Catholicism as “the religion of the
State,” seems necessarily contained in the very notion of the State’s duty to accept and profess
the true religion, therefore Catholicism, with its creed, code, and cult. How else could the State,
qua State, in truth accept and profess Catholicism, together with its tenet that it alone is the true
30
religion.
In sum, the principal proposition of traditional Catholic doctrine on Church and state is that the Church, as
part of her liberty, enjoys the right to be established as the state’s one and only religion.
V. The Church’s Powers, Direct and Indirect
Before turning to an important condition precedent to the Church’s being established, we should
be clear about what the Church claims the powers to do. While the discussion today sounds in terms of
libertas, historically the focus was on potestas: what liberty the Church claims is to exercise power.
Limitations of space allow only a brief summary of the two powers, direct and indirect, that the Church
has claimed over the centuries.
The Church’s indirect power refers to her right of authority to declare null and void putative civil
laws that violate the natural law or the divine law. Summing up centuries of papal teaching and other
reflection on the indirect power, Jacques Maritain explains that
[t]he Church has thus a right of authority over the political or the temporal itself, not because of
political things, but because of the spiritual principle involved. One sword is under the other: not
to be oppressed in it own sphere, but to be controlled and directed by the upper sword as
regards the latter’s own sphere. The special interventions of the spiritual in temporal matters
are motivated by one object only, the avoidance or repression of sin. . . . [I]t is the ratio peccati
which is alleged by Innocent IV against Frederick II and by Boniface VIII against Philip the Fair.
The ratio peccati is the essential justification for the intervention of the Church in temporal
affairs. This doctrine is unchangeable. . . . Anyone paying sufficient attention to the substance of
things underlying the various incidents of history will perceive that one same teaching is
imparted by Boniface VIII in the Bull Unam Sanctam and by Leo XIII in the Encyclical Immortale
Dei; and for a complete idea of the indirect power, both these great documents should be
31
simultaneously borne in mind.
This power, Maritain explains, “extends as far as the primacy of the spiritual requires; for the Church is
32
not disarmed, her right is effective and efficient.”
The indirect power is derivative of the direct power, and the latter is exactly the right of authority
of the Church to exercise a real jurisdiction over certain people (e.g., clerics) and certain subject matter
(dogma, sacraments, doctrine on natural law, etc.). The point to underscore is that the Church’s direct
power over herself is every bit as a real as the state’s power over itself. When Pope Gelasius wrote that
“there are two things by which this world is chiefly governed: the sacred authority of the pontiffs and the
power of kings,” he was not claiming that the world is ruled by kings but merely exhorted by a
30

Id. at 167-68
JACQUES MARITAIN, THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT CAESAR’S 12-13 (1930). Maritain later defended a position that
contradicts what he had judged to be “unchangeable doctrine,” but although Maritain changed his mind,
the “unchangeable doctrine” remained unchanged.
32
Id. at 15. The classic formulation of the doctrine of the indirect power is by St. Robert Bellarmine in On
the Temporal Power of the Pope, Against William Barclay, in STEFANIA TUTINO, ON TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL
AUTHORITY 185-90 (2012). On the foundations of Bellarmine’s account of the indirect power, see STEFANIA
TUTINO, EMPIRE OF SOULS: ROBERT BELLARMINE AND THE CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH 9-47 (2010).
31
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jurisdiction-less voluntary association known as the Church. Pope Leo XIII restated the two powers
doctrine in the encyclical Immortale Dei:
God has divided between the ecclesiastical and the civil power the task of procuring the wellbeing of the human race. He has appointed the former to divine, the latter to human things.
Each of them is supreme in its own sphere (utraque potestas est, in genere suo, maxima); each is
enclosed within perfectly defined boundaries, delimited in exact conformity with its nature and
principle. Each is therefore circumscribed within a sphere in which it can act and move in virtue
33
of its own peculiar laws.
The Code of Canon Law promulgated in 1983 continues to make unmistakable the Church’s claim to be a
34
perfect society that exercises a real jurisdiction through law, one that limits and bounds the state. This
is the stuff of scandal, not agreement.
VI. In a Catholic Society
Returning to the proposition that the Catholic Church enjoys a divine right to be the only
established religion of the state, it is, as I mentioned, subject to an important condition precedent. That
condition appears quite matter-of-factly in the block quotation at the end of Section IV: “in a Catholic
society.” Where the people and its leaders are not Catholic, it would be nonsense to suggest that the
state should establish the Catholic religion. It is, in fact, ordinarily through the people and those that they
35
designate as their civil authorities that the rights of the Catholic Church are discovered and given effect.
The claim one hears frequently today, that states are in principle “incompetent” to recognize the truth of
the Catholic religion, is sheer prejudice. Our present government may be incompetent in the sense of
using the faculty to know the truth poorly, but the failure is not on the ontological level. It is a separate
question, calling for a context-specific judgment, as to the fraction of a particular people and its leaders
36
that must be Catholic before the obligation to establish the Catholic religion attaches.
Needless to say, it does not remotely attach in the United States today. My topic, though, is
what the Church teaches regarding the libertas Ecclesiae, and that teaching in its fullness is not restricted
to its application here and now. My account would be incomplete, however, if I did not add that it is the
traditional judgment that any society that is not Catholic and therefore cannot mount a Catholic state is in
a deficient situation, here in the words of Pope St. Pius X:
[T]he City cannot be built otherwise than has God has built it; society cannot be set up unless the
Church lays the foundations and supervises the work; no, civilization is not something yet to be
found, nor is the New City to be built upon hazy notions; it has been in existence and still is: it is
Christian civilization, it is the Catholic City. It has only to be set up and restored continually
against the unremitting attacks of insane dreamers, rebels and miscreants. OMNIA INSTAURARE
37
IN CHRISTO.
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This is not an eccentric position to hold, at least not historically. St. Augustine held that no society can be
38
truly just without the true religion.
VII. Novelty, at Vatican II?
Having now unpacked the lion’s share of the contents of the relinquit clause, we are almost in
position to return to and follow the line of argument of Dignitatis. First, however, an anticipatory
summary is in order. After loquaciously claiming that the libertas Ecclesiae is the principium
fundamentale between the Church and state, Dignitatis fails to go on to make anything remotely
resembling the traditional claim that the Church has the right, in a Catholic society, to be established as
the religion of the state, to exercise a direct power of jurisdiction in all her spheres of action, and to
exercise the indirect power with respect to the state. Loquacious is not the same as adequate, and it
must be admitted that Dignitatis’s appearance of unequivocal insistence on the libertas Ecclesiae is, at
best, misleading. Many of the most decisive aspects of that libertas as traditionally understood in
unchangeable doctrine are missing from Dignitatis. Where the document has occasion to draw important
implications of the relinquit clause, it is virtually silent. Silence does not work contradiction, but it can
mislead – and intentionally so.
What the document does claim can be usefully (if clunkily) divided into three categories: positive,
what the Church has a right to; equivocal, what the Church sort of has a right to; and negative, what the
Church does not have a right to.
In the positive category, Dignitatis claims the following for the Church:
In human society and in the face of government, the Church claims freedom for her self in her
character as a spiritual authority, established by Christ the Lord. Upon this authority there rests,
by divine mandate, the duty of going out into the whole world and preaching the gospel to every
creature. The Church also claims freedom for herself in her character as a society of men who
39
have the right to live in society in accordance with the precepts of Christian faith.
Dignitatis goes on to state that for fulfilling her divine mandate, “independence is precisely what the
authorities of the Church claim in society.” It is the Church’s “duty,” Dignitatis continues, “to give
utterance to, and authoritatively to teach, that Truth which is Christ Himself, and also to declare and
confirm by her authority those principles of the moral order which have their origin in human nature
40
41
itself.” The Church’s freedom and that of the individuals is to be protected by “constitutional law.”
In the equivocal category, I place the following one-sentence paragraph that John Courtney
42
Murray described as “carefully phrased” but that might better be described as irritatingly and
irresponsibly elliptical:
If, in view of peculiar circumstances obtaining among certain peoples, special legal recognition is
given in the constitutional order of society to one religious body, it is at the same time
imperative that the right of all citizens and religious bodies to religious freedom should be
43
recognized and made effective in practice.
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What seems unmistakable in this paragraph is the Council’s intent that the right of “religious freedom”
can sometimes operate as a limit on the establishment of a religion, presumably even the Catholic
religion. It seems that establishment, even of the Catholic religion, is to be limited by the duty to respect
religious minorities. What is less easy to discern is when, provided that that condition is respected,
religion, including the Catholic religion, should be given special legal recognition. Glossing this text, John
Courtney Murray opined that “the Council wished to insinuate that establishment, at least from the
44
Catholic point of view, is a matter of historical circumstance, not of theological doctrine.”
Murray, of course, had spent many years before the Council trying to demonstrate that the
principles of traditional Catholic teaching on Church and state no longer apply, and these exertions may
have contributed to his misreading of Dignitatis on the last point. It was Murray’s “personal thesis” that
Dignitatis “renounces all special privileges and establishments for the Church,” but, as Russell Hittinger
45
has observed, “[i]n this case, Murray was wrong.” The one-sentence paragraph of Dignitatis specifically
allowing “special legal recognition” does not bear the reading Murray gave it, nor does any other text of
the Council support Murray’s misreading. Such a misreading, furthermore, would not only contradict
tradition – a sufficient ground for ruling it out; it would also suffer the embarrassment of contradicting
something Dignitatis itself teaches quite clearly and strongly. Specifically, as already noted, Dignitatis
“insists that the Church’s liberty derives first from Christ (hence, the principium fundamentale), and also
(etiam) from her character as a society of men.” What Murray sought to write off as (mere) “historical
circumstance” was, on the contrary, and as already noted above, a matter of “theological doctrine,” a
point even Dignitatis itself acknowledged, if in conjunction with the additional ground (to which we shall
return) that the Church is “a society of men.” It is the judgment of Russell Hittinger, pace Murray, that the
Declaration’s “position on religious liberty would probably count as favoring the establishment of
46
religion.”
In the negative category, finally, falls the proposition for which Dignitatis is most widely
celebrated. In order to take the measure of this proposition, it will be useful to start by clarifying the
context. We can stipulate that traditional Catholic teaching clearly and consistently maintained the
following three principles, even if, alas, historical practice did not always conform to them:
1.
2.
3.

No one must be forced to act against his conscience in private.
No one must be forced to act against his conscience in public.
No one must be forced to act against his conscience in public or in private, but may be
forced to act against his conscience when the matter involves a violation of natural law and
civil authorities determine that it would be in the interest of the common good to do so.

These three rights of individuals and groups limit the action of both Church and state. The quaestio
disputata is whether Dignitatis adds the following fourth principle – either as a development of doctrine
or as a prudential teaching -- to the list of the three traditional principles:
4.

No one may be prevented from acting in accordance with his conscience in public, provided
47
the “public order” is not violated.

Such a principle (Principle 4), if valid doctrine, would deny the Church the right to insist, under proper
circumstances, that the Catholic religion alone be practiced in public; correlatively, it would also disallow
the state from permitting only the Catholic religion to be practiced in public. The question, then, is
whether the libertas Ecclesiae is limited and reduced by a competing right of “religious freedom” in public.
VIII. “Deliramentum”
44
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Prior to the Council there was among Catholic theologians what John T. Noonan, Jr., has
described as “unanimity” against the possibility of such a right to “religious freedom” in public. The
theologians were united, Noonan explains, because “they followed what [Pope] Gregory XVI had taught in
Mirari vos, what Pius IX, following Gregory XVI, had taught in Quanta cura, what Leo XIII in the wake of his
48
predecessors had proclaimed in Immortale Dei.” What Gregory had declared that had been followed
boils down to this: “From [the] most foul fruit of indifferentism flows that absurd and erroneous opinion,
49
or rather, madness, that freedom of conscience must be affirmed for everyone.” Noonan comments:
“Deliramentum, meaning ‘madness,’ is the term used by both Gregory XVI and Pius IX. It is sometimes
softened by being translated ‘aberration’; but ‘madness’ is what Gregory XVI chose to call liberty of
50
conscience; and Pius IX repeated the term in Quanta cura.”
In the middle of and amidst the bloodiest century of human history, however, the Fathers of the
Second Vatican Council divined that “[a] sense of the dignity of the person” – from which the Declaration
takes its very name – “has been impressing itself more and more deeply on the consciousness of
51
52
contemporary man,” and that that dignity requires “religious freedom.” In what has been described
as “the most important article” of Dignitatis, Article 2, one reads the following:
This Vatican Synod declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. This
freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of
social groups and of any human power, in such wise that in matters religious no one is to be
forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs.
As Michael Davies notes, “[u]p to this point everything can be reconciled with traditional doctrine.”
same holds for the language that immediately follows:

53

The

Nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs, whether privately .
..
But then comes this:
. . . or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits.

54

Even here harmony with traditional doctrine could have been maintained if “within due limits” were
specified as “the common good,” for the common good was indeed the traditional criterion according to
which the state was to determine what to allow and what to forbid.
This last point merits emphasis and unpacking. As understood in the tradition of Catholic
political theory, the common good as the object of state action included not just public order, nor just the
55
temporal common good, but also the supernatural common good. The traditional doctrine, without
confusing or conflating Church and state, assured that Church and state worked in concert, wherever and
to the extent possible, for the achievement of the two common goods in which humans by God’s design
are called and commanded to participate. As Henri De Lubac (whom Pope Paul VI wished to create a
Cardinal and whom Pope John Paul II did create a Cardinal, in each case for his theological work)
explained, “[the Church’s] power is spiritual in its object, as in its nature and its end; but it extends
48
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nonetheless for that to all this is human, for it extends to all that is spiritual in every human affair in which
56
it is engaged.” On the traditional view, the state must adhere to the Church’s judgment on what is
57
necessary in all that touches man’s sacredness.
58
Aware of all of this, the drafters of Dignitatis deliberately rejected “the common good” in favor
of the much more limited notion “public order:”
The right to religious freedom is exercised in human society; hence its exercise is subject to
certain regulatory norms. . . . [S]ociety has the right to defend itself against possible abuses
committed on pretext of freedom of religion. It is the special duty of government to provide this
protection. . . . These norms arise out of the need for effective safeguard of the rights of all
citizens and for peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights. They flow from the need for an
adequate care of genuine public peace, which comes about when men live together in good
order and in true justice. They come, finally, out of the need for a proper guardianship of public
morality. These matters constitute the common welfare: they are what is meant by public order.
For the rest, the usages of society are to be the usages of freedom in their full range. These
require that the freedom of man be respected as far as possible, and curtailed only when and in
59
so far as necessary.
Commenting on the last two-sentence paragraph, Murray opined that
Secular experts may well consider this to be the most significant sentence in the Declaration. It is
a statement of the basic principle of the “free society.” The principle has important origins in the
medieval tradition of kingship, law, and jurisprudence. But its statement by the Church has an
60
accent of blessed newness – the newness of a renewal of the tradition.
The third quoted sentence is actionable: Murray knew perfectly well that this origin also includes a
fundamental relationship to the common good. The free society and the limits on civil ruling power are
all discussed in light of the purpose of society, viz., the common good. Be that as it may, the “newness” of
the retreat from the common good was not lost on Paul Blanshard, who wrote contemptuously of
attempts to disguise change as “development.” According to Blanshard, Dignitatis represented “a great
advance in Catholic policy, perhaps the greatest single advance in principle during all four sessions of the
61
Council.” He continues: “The star of the American delegation was John Courtney Murray, whose chief
function was to give the pedestrian bishops the right words with which to change some ancient doctrines
62
without admitting that they were being changed.” A broken clock is right twice daily.
IX. In Public?
What exactly it means to “renew[]” tradition with “newness” has been debated ever since
Murray boasted of it. Murray certainly knew how to turn a phrase, but the doctrinal question is whether
56
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there has been contradiction rather development in the teaching proffered by Dignitatis. On the answer
to this question turns the scope of the liberty the Church claims for herself.
One position (Position 1) is that the teaching of Article 2, which I have summarized as Principle 4,
is authoritatively taught by the Council as a matter of doctrine in open contradiction of traditional
teaching. Those who hold this view speak of a rupture in the tradition, and adhere to the traditional view.
A variation on this position (Position 2) acknowledges the contradiction between traditional doctrine and
the teaching of Dignitatis in Article 2, but points out that Pope Paul VI, who closed Vatican II in December
63
of 1965, stated that the Council was purely pastoral in nature and defined no new doctrines. On this
latter view, Principle 4 is said to be a prudential concession to the modern world, not a change in
doctrine.
Another position (Position 3), and by far the most common, is that what appears to be
contradiction is instead “development,” a new understanding of what has been handed down and taught
authoritatively. As already noted, proponents of this view can indeed point to the fact that Dignitatis
states its intent to develop doctrine. For his part, Murray confessed (without a trace of irony or
compunction) that he had no idea what the principle underlying the touted development was: “The
course of the development between the Syllabus of Errors (1864) and Dignitatis Humanae Personae
64
(1965) still remains to be explained by theologians.” Others have struggled to specify a deeper principle
65
that guided a development that avoids contradiction and thus avoids rupture. Where proponents of
66
Position 1 see rupture, advocates of Position 3 see “development in continuity,” although on some
67
accounts advanced for Position 3, rupture is almost admitted and celebrated.
Proponents of Position 1 reply that Dignitatis does not develop traditional doctrine but, instead,
contradicts it. Here is the claimed contradiction:
A non-Catholic possesses a natural right not to be prevented from the public expression of error,
limited only by the just requirements of public order.
A non-Catholic does not possess a natural right not to be prevented from the public expression of
68
error, limited only by the just requirements of public order.
Dignitatis is celebrated as teaching the former. The tradition plainly, authoritatively, and repeatedly
taught the latter, even as the tradition also conceded that sometimes the state will prudently tolerate the
public practice of non-Catholic religions, as Pope Leo XIII makes unmistakable here:
The Church, indeed, deems it unlawful to place various forms of Divine Worship on the same
footing as the true religion, but does not, on that account, condemn those rulers who for the
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sake of securing some great good, or of hindering some great evil, tolerate in practice that these
69
various forms of religion have a place in the State.
The just-quoted passage is from Leo’s encyclical Immortale Dei, in which the Pope also states: “This, then,
is the teaching of the Church concerning the constitution and government of the state.” Dignitatis’s
70
contradiction of authoritative teaching is hard to blink.
One final position (Position 4) should be mentioned, and it brings us back to the “relinquit” clause
of Article 1 of Dignitatis. Some interpreters of Dignitatis argue, plausibly enough, that the entire text
must read in light of Article 1’s affirmation of “traditional Catholic doctrine.” As Michael Davies has
commented, however, “[i]t is all very well . . . to argue that the entire Declaration must be interpreted in
71
the light of Article 1, but, surely, Article 1 must also be interpreted in the light of the entire Declaration.”
How is Dignitatis’s statement, for example, that “it would clearly transgress the limits set to [the state’s]
power to were it to presume to direct or inhibit acts that are religious” to be read in a way that does not
contradict the following statement by Leo XIII in Libertas humana:
To judge aright, we must acknowledge that the more a State is driven to tolerate evil, the further
it is from perfection; and that the tolerance of evil which is dictated by political prudence should
72
be strictly confined to the limits which its justifying cause, the public welfare requires.
To take the relinquit clause for all it is potentially worth would be mysteriously to vaporize every
celebrated statement that comes later (or earlier) in the document, or at least, as suggested in Position 2,
to reduce every one of them to the status of prudential guidance for a time in which the possibility of
Catholic states seems, as it does, to be next to nil.
This is not the place to attempt a comprehensive resolution of this dispute about the doctrinal
73
status vel non of Principle 4, and I specifically prescind from that question. Enough has been said to
clarify how the terms according to which it gets resolved settle some of the scope of the libertas Ecclesiae.
X. Liberty Not the Fundamental Principle
Regardless of where exactly the boundary of that scope gets set, it will not be disputed that I
have expounded what in contemporary idiom might be called (not altogether complimentarily) a “thick”
concept of libertas Ecclesiae. But why -- we must ask -- should the state accede to the Church’s demands
contained in that concept? As one commentator has observed unexceptionably: “Certainly, it would be a
deplorable petitio principii to argue: ‘The civil rulers must yield to the Church’s demands, because the
74
Church so decrees.’” How, then, to defend what the Church teaches about the libertas Ecclesiae
without, in fact, begging the question?
The argument of Dignitatis does encompass the so-called liberal pluralist rationale for respecting
so-called “mediating institutions.” It does so in the following language, which I first quoted in Section [] of
69
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this paper: “The Church also claims freedom for herself in her character as a society of men who have the
75
right to live in society . . . .” As a general matter, I have considerable sympathy for the argument that
associations having their own ends and ontological structure should be respected, helped when
necessary, and not absorbed by the state. This is the learning not just of contemporary liberal pluralists
(such as Isaiah Berlin, William Galston, Richard Garnett, and John Inazu,) and of their antecedents (such as
F.W. Maitland, J.N. Figgis, Harold Laski, G.D.H. Cole, and E. Barker), but it is also part of the social doctrine
of the Catholic Church, wherein it is identified as the principle of subsidiarity (or, as it is sometimes called,
76
the principle of subsidiary function). Arguments along these lines are the ones commonly advanced
today where the freedom of the Church is defended as an aspect of a pluralist liberal democracy.
To the extent that these arguments succeed in preserving some of the liberty of the Church, it
may prove to be counterproductive to object to them or to oppose them. Or it may not so prove. The
trouble is that they succeed, if they do succeed, at the high price of distorting or eclipsing the Church’s
claim about something antecedent to herself: Christ. To see this is to see what is, at best, insufficient in
Dignitatis’s assertion, with which we began, that “[t]he freedom of the Church is the fundamental
principle.”
The Church is the mystical body of Christ, Christ-continued in the world, and it is at best
misleading to say that her “freedom” is the fundamental determinant of the state’s obligation to
recognize her.
Freedom is not the fundamental principle, nor a fundamental principle in the matter. The public
law of the Church is founded on the State’s duty to recognize the social royalty of Our Lord Jesus
Christ. [The opposition we make between “liberty” and “the social royalty of Our Lord Jesus
Christ” is not an opposition of contradiction but an opposition of “the whole and the part,” in the
sense that the social royalty of Our Lord Jesus Christ does include the freedom of the Church in
relation to the temporal power, but that liberty alone is not the whole of the doctrine of the
social reign of Christ!] The fundamental principle which governs the relations between Church
and State is the “He must reign” of St. Paul (I Cor. 15:25) – the reign that applies not only to the
Church but must be the foundation of the temporal City. That is what the Church teaches, and it
77
is what she claims as her first and chief right in the City.
Rather than the libertas Ecclesiae, what is fundamental is the social reign of Christ. What is meant by this
phrase is, in relevant part, that the civil ruler must submit to the Church’s judgment because it is the will
of Christ the King – the “supernatural statute,” of which Murray spoke -- that the civil ruler submit to the
Church speaking in the world in the name of Christ the King on matters touching the sacred. The Church is
possessed of legitimate ruling power, a real and final and God-given jurisdiction, not just directionless
“liberty.” Needless to say, liberal-pluralist arguments do not result in the indirect power by which the
Church implements the will of Christ through the direct and indirect powers. On the Church’s selfunderstanding, however, she speaks not in her own name, at least not ultimately, but in the name of
Christ, whose Mystical Body she is. As Francis Connell explains, “if the Catholic Church possesses” – as
she traditionally has claimed – “the authority to exercise jure proprio functions involving a restriction of
the rights granted by the natural law to civil rulers, the only possible explanation of this direct power on
78
the part of the Church is the authorization of Jesus Christ, the Son of God.” The exemplary case of this
reduction of the state’s jurisdiction is the Church’s demand in Christ’s name that, in a Catholic society, the
Church alone be established as the religion of the state. What was left indeterminate by the natural law
(viz., how God was to be worshipped) has been made determinate by Christ and the law of the Church,
75
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and, according to traditional Catholic doctrine “integram relinquit” by Dignitatis and the Second Vatican
Council, this determination binds the state as a matter of higher law.
A moment’s attention to an ongoing “public policy” debate will clarify the point. The Catholic
bishops of the United States are earnestly arguing that the big problem with the Patient Protection Act is
that it interferes with “religious freedom” and – as they sometimes add – the freedom of the Church by
compelling the Church to provide artificial contraceptives to those who are doing the Church’s work. This
objection is true but, for reasons already adduced, wildly incomplete. The other problem with this law is
not just that it forces us (Catholics or the Church) to do what we regard as in violation of the divine and
natural law; it is not just that it forces us and others to do what we and they regard as in violation of those
higher laws; the problem is also -- and above all -- that it forces us and others to do what violates higher
law, the will of Christ the King, irrespective of who does or does not consider it to be a violation of higher
law. The mission and liberty of the Church is ultimately to transform the world and men’s souls in the
image of Christ, not just to look inward and protect the internal life of the Church. It is by divine right that
the Church possesses jurisdiction over her hospitals; Leviathan does not.
XI. Tolerance and Intolerance
To state the obvious, we live in a world that is obsessed with “freedom” and “liberty,”
understood, of course, in the negative sense of “freedom from.” But, as John Garvey (among others) has
79
reminded us, freedoms are for something. When the Church claims a right to freedom, she is, in this
limited respect at least, in the same position as any other group or individual claiming a right to freedom:
we can ask of her, and we should ask of her: What is it for? What is its justification? In respect of the
answer she gives, however, the Church is toto caelo different. To put the point in its strongest form, it is
80
ancient Catholic doctrine that “the world was created for the sake of the Church.” The Church’s
ultimate claim for her freedom is to vindicate the divine will in the very ends of creation itself by her
teaching, sanctifying, and ruling power in the world. This is a claim that the culture does not accept, and
for that reason, among others, the Church finds herself in the position of arguing for her freedom on
grounds recognized by the liberal pluralist. One must add, however, that there never existed a time
81
when the Church could “count on peace” as she goes about her work of claiming the world for Christ.
On what basis, then, can one defend the teaching Church’s own distance, in recent decades,
from the doctrine of the social kingship of Christ? Dignitatis is silent on this Catholic doctrine, as was the
82
Second Vatican Council in its entire (prolific) corpus. Even Catholic liturgy has been rewritten to mute
83
the traditional claims of Christ’s social royalty. Silence, however, does not effect reversal of permanent
doctrine. In any event, of course, the teaching-Church’s bashfulness about the social kingship of Christ is
powerless to uncrown Him, though it is a powerful contributor to His being neglected.
A brief word of autobiography may be apposite en route to some concluding thoughts
concerning tolerance. Until several years ago, I saw only dimly the extent to which the foundation of the
political order requires theological, not just philosophical, judgments and correlative commitments.
Studying (and later reviewing) Michael J. White’s book Partisan or Neutral: The Futility of Public Political
84
Theory was a start, as was my roughly contemporaneous work on human equality which, within the
course of several years, moved from publishing a book titled By Nature Equal: The Anatomy of a Western
Insight to confessing in an article that “[a]part from marketing purposes the book might well have been
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titled, By Super-Nature Equal.” Gradually but insistently my hope for an adequate political philosophy
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was overtaken by a judgment that political theology is not only appropriate but exigent. As a believing
Catholic throughout, I eventually came to the understanding that, to adopt a phrase, “Catholicity [Is]
87
Necessary to Sustain Popular Liberty.” As I went on to recover more and more of the Catholic tradition
that had been hidden from me in my youth (in the 1970s and 1980s, in southern California!), I saw more
and more the socio-juridical implications of my Catholic belief that the kingship of Christ is the only
historical inevitability. No matter now much we, as individuals or as a society, evade it, in the end “He
must reign” (I Cor. 15:25). Philosophy cannot succeed where Christ and His law must prevail.
On the traditional Catholic view, there is no completely principled middle ground between the
demands of the social kingship of Christ and indifferentism. Catholics have always lived in the real world
along with everybody else, though, and in every era some sort of modus vivendi is worked out. The
tradition has amply acknowledged the need for tolerance, even if too often individuals acting in the
Church’s name have acted coercively when they should have shown tolerance. In any event, no one with
an adequate appreciation of the wrong of coercing a person to be baptized can, with consistency, oppose
whatever tolerance the facts require or counsel. Catholic states should be, and often have been,
conspicuous for their tolerance of practitioners of and the practice of non-Catholic religions. It is too little
remembered in the Whig narrative of history, for example, that it was Whigs who opposed James II of
England’s “Declaration of Toleration.” The Catholic position, of which James II was exemplary, defends
generous and respectful toleration when prudence calls for it. To claim a “right” to tolerance where what
is proposed for tolerance would violate the common good, however, is another matter. The point to
underscore is that it is the common goods, natural and supernatural, not mere “public order,” that
88
properly set the limits of tolerance.
89
It is of course obviously true that “we live today in the religiously neutral state.” Such
neutrality, however, is in derogation from the Catholic ideal. The Catholic tradition denies John Locke’s
contention that “[t]he magistrate as magistrate hath nothing to do with the good of souls or their
concernments in another life, but is ordained and entrusted with his power only for the quiet and
90
comfortable living of men in society. . . . .” Even Dignitatis, it should be remembered by that
document’s Catholic champions and cheerleaders, teaches that government has “the obligation to
91
promote the free exercise of religion.”
If the consequences of this obligation sound ominous, consider for a moment that free exercise
of religion for individuals, or even for groups, does not destabilize the unitary jurisdiction claimed by
Leviathan. Libertas Ecclesiae in action does, however, and this promises to be liberating. Individuals
cannot stand against the monolith state, as the Whiskey Rebellion, Shays’ Rebellion, and such like
demonstrate. Political subdivisions cannot do so, as the Civil War proved. The Church alone is the
ontological inruption into human history that can put the state, even an otherwise pretty good state,
where it actually belongs. It is therefore tragic that, in the heart of the century that produced the Fuhrer
and generally exalted the unitary jurisdiction of the state, Dignitatis muted the Church’s ancient claim to
exercise a real jurisdiction in all spheres of her action (sacraments, liturgy, schools, hospitals, etc.), in
favor of building up individual religious liberty instead. Only another perfect society possessed of a real
jurisdiction can stand against the blitzkrieg of the “mortal God” Leviathan, and the good of souls requires
nothing less of the Church. I do not hope for a time when the Church will “be sufficiently nothing to live in
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peace with the rest of the world . . . .” Widows, orphans, the poor, and many others whom the world
loves not are among the intended beneficiaries of the Church’s demand that the state conform its ways to
Christ’s. Liberal opponents of the libertas Ecclesiae would do well to keep all of this in mind when they
seek to marginalize or vaporize the Church.
Ours is not remotely a Catholic society, and for that reason, among others, the Catholic state that
is the ideal proposed by the Church is not at risk of coming into existence any time soon. Many
participants in the discussion at the conference at which this paper was presented were respectfully
tolerant of the Catholic model’s challenge, at least at the level of theory, to the liberal model that
currently enjoys a monopoly. Others, however, made unmistakable that they considered the mere
mention of the Catholic ideal to be an offense far more grave than “bad taste.” I had committed the
unpardonable sin of questioning the American civil religion, an irrefutable body of value judgments that
operate at an axiological level. To question them is to apostatize.
I am by no means the first to observe the irony in the blazing intolerance of some self-styled
liberals, nor am I the first to register the fact that “principled” liberal intolerance of illiberal positions
demonstrates the terminal incoherence of liberalism itself. As Nicholas Wolterstorff, himself a defender
of the liberal state, has observed, “the resolve not to think about political issues in religious and
theological terms has not produced agreement, either on principles or on practice. The dream has
93
failed.” It was a dream, and it failed. Especially in light of that failure, there is no embarrassment in
recovering and advancing political theology. My present plea to the intolerant liberal is for him or her to
recognize, at the very least, that the Church does not seek to aggrandize herself; she comes to do the will
of Christ the King, whose right she seeks to vindicate.
I shall conclude by suggesting that a modus vivendi that makes the room required for genuine
and ample tolerance can consist with argument and appropriate action on behalf not only of “free
exercise of religion,” but also of a principled Catholic society and, in turn, the Catholic state that such a
society would help to realize. The twain ends of a Catholic state are to help people be happy in this life
and to get to heaven. To offer such help – while never coercing the unbaptized to embrace the Catholic
religion – is no less than justice requires, and it should also be understood as an act of love. “There was a
94
time,” wrote Pope Leo XIII, “when states were governed according to the philosophy of the Gospels.”
That philosophy, which is at the same time a theology, proclaims God’s loving will that all be saved (I Tim.
2:4), and freely. But “freely” does not mean without help, including the help of government that can act
prudently but decisively on behalf of both common goods, natural and supernatural.
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